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21 OCTOBER 1959

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Objectives of Khrushchev's policy described as isolation of US and gaining time to build up bloc strength.

25X1 Khrushchev tells he sees improved Soviet-American relations.

Mao Tse-tung declares Sino-Indian border dispute is "minor matter" that will be settled.


II. ASIA-AFRICA


Laos--Friction developing between oldline and younger politicians could lead to government crisis.

Kenya--Tension continues high between government and African population.

III. THE WEST

 $\begin{tabular}{ll} Bolivia--Government \ minister \ threatens \\ coup \ attempt. \end{tabular}$





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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

21 October 1959

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

	1. 1111 00111101111 1 1 1 1 1	
	USSR: The major aims of Khrushchev's policy of ''peace-ful coexistence'' are to isolate the United States from the rest of the world and to gain time in which to build up the bloc's	· 25X1
0EV4	military and economic power,	25X1
25X1	military and economic power,	
25X1	Khrushchev's strategy was said	
0 K	to call for preserving the status quo for the next few years, after which the USSR and Communist China will be so strong that they will be able to prevent "imperialist" intervention in coun-	25X1
05)/4	tries where revolutions are taking place.	J
25X1	Khrushchev has also	
•	presented these views to Chinese and other Communist leaders. Moscow may have felt the need to provide a more complete explanation of the coexistence policy to rank-and-file members of the international Communist movement.	25X1
	(Page 1)	25X1
		20/1
	USSR-US: Khrushchev told]
25X1		
23/1	"America was very interesting; I had a lot to learn." Knrusnchev added that while there still are people in the United States who	25X1
Mo	want to continue the cold war, and although there are misunder-	
μ	standings in the USSR about the United States, this situation will	
	improve. He believed a summit meeting would still be held be-	
	fore the end of the year and said the main problems were disarm-	0.5\
	ament, ending the cold war, and Germany including Berlin,	25X
7		
	Sino-Indian border: Peiping's concern that Western influ-	25X1
	ence could increase in India as a result of the border dispute was	20/1
	indicated by Mao Tse-tung	
OK	indicated by Mao Isc-tung	
		25X1
	. i	
	1	
	25X1	

rigida . A		25X1 ~		
5X1 5X1		Mao discussed the "growth of right reactionaries and military dictatorships" in Asia and, in this context, stressed the "great importance" of Sino-Indian friendship. Mao made a decided effort to play down the Sino-Indian border dispute as a "minor matter which is going to be settled." According to recent press reports, as yet unconfirmed, Chinese troops have withdrawn from the disputed outpost of Longju, which they seized on 26 August. If true, this would indicate Peiping may be moving loward an accommodation with New Delhi. Page 3)	25X1	25X1
5X1		II. ASIA-AFRICA		
*		Laos: /Political maneuvering is growing in Vientiane over how best to postpone elections scheduled for Decembera postpone-ment necessitated by the present insurrection. Friction between old-line and younger elements appears to be developing and could lead to a governmental crisis. Premier Phoui himself is concerned over the possibility that younger elements, with army backing, may be considering a take-over. (Page 4)		25X1 25X1
	ok.	*Kenya: Tension continues high between the Kenya Government and the Africans after police on 20 October broke up a demonstration by African nationalists seeking the release of Mau Mau leader Jomo Kenyatta. The demonstration for Kenyatta by followers of African leader Mboya appears to have been planned despite the possibility that it might lead to Mboya's arrest, and was probably directed less toward the release of Kenyatta than toward embarrassing the Kenya Government. (Page 5)	25X1	
		III. THE WEST		
	OF	Bolivia: The moderate Minister of Government Guevara Arce, a member of the right wing of the governing Nationalist Revolutionary Movement who has presidential ambitions, has reportedly threatened to carry out a coupbacked by 800 armed miners and		

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DAILY BRIEF

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possibly aided by the police--if the Bolivian Congress adjourns without resolving the struggle between President Siles and the country's acting vice president, who heads the Senate and opposes Siles. Other members of the ruling party have in the past threatened to stage a coup. Any coup attempt would probably set off an intense struggle for power and civil strife.

[Page 6]

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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Moscow Explains Aims of "Peaceful Coexistence" Policy to	
Indian Communists	25X1
(m) : (If he will all only of the pool of	
(The major aims of Khrushchev's policy of ''peaceful co- existence'' are to isolate the United States from the rest of	
the world and to gain time in which to build up the bloc's mili-	
tary and economic power.	7 2574
tal v and economic bower.	☐ 25X1
Khrushchev's strategy is said to call for preser	'V -
ing the status quo for "seven years or so," after which the USSI	
and Communist China will be so strong that they will be able to	
prevent "imperialist" intervention in countries where revolution	າຣ
are taking place. With this major shift in the international bala	
of power toward the Sino-Soviet bloc, recurrence of such situa-	
tions as Taiwan and Korea will be avoided, the Indian Commu-	
nists were advised.	
	25X1
Khrushchev has also presented these views to Ch	
nese and other Communist leaders. This suggests that Moscow f	
the need to provide a detailed interpretation of the coexistence	
policy to rank-and-file members of the international Communis	t
movement.	
Soviet leaders are said to feel that "official circles" in the	
United States are divided between those who favor coexistence	an a
with the USSR and those who favor a policy of maintaining tension. The major achievement of Khrushchev's visit to the United States	
was h	
exploitation of this rift to gain more support among the "coexis"	•
group, which allegedly commands "greater" support with the A	
can people.	
Moscow reportedly assumes that nothing will come of Khru	
proposal for general and complete disarmament. While there to	nay be/

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partial disarmament, the "imperialists" are fundamentally opposed to disarmament, in Moscow's view. (Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence strategy eventually is to	
lead to the "automatic" surrender of the US, after the rest of the world is Communist. In this connection, a major Soviet objective is to convince the American people they would be losers in a nuclear war. They claimed that the Soviet sputniks and luniks have been successful to a great extent in demoralizing the American people.	25>
the Chinese Communist threats to liberate Taiwan are designed to show that Peiping does not fear the US, but Peiping will not attack Taiwan in the foreseeable future and cannot do so without the USSR's consent.	
Khrushchev at that time reportedly urged that	
Communist parties in India and other nonbloc countries should avoid uprisings and other "warlike situations," on the grounds that if war can be avoided for three or four years, the military	
strength of the bloc will surpass that of the capitalist powers, especially the United States.	25>
	25)

25X1

25X1

25X1

Mao Tse-tung Reported Concerned Over Western Influence	
In India	25X1
	25/(1
Mao Tse-tung recently indicated his concern over the in-	
roads Western influence could make in Asia and particularly in	
India because of adverse reaction to Peiping's role in the Sino-	
Indian border dispute,	25X1
Stressing the "great importance" of Sino-Indian friendship, Mao	25/(1
implied	25V1
he puts a high value on improving relations with New Delhi as a	25X1
useful hedge against "the growth of right reactionaries and mil-	
itary dictatorships."	
That y account on po.	
(In this context, Mao made a decided effort to play down the	
border issue, terming it a "minor matter which is going to be set-	_
tled" and assuring the Indians that Peiping has no intention of com-	
mitting "aggression" against India. The Chinese already may have	
taken their first steps toward meeting Nehru's stipulation that Chi-	
nese troops must withdraw from Lonju. Recent press reports, as	
yet unconfirmed, state the Chinese are withdrawing from the out-	
post they seized on 26 August.	
l	
(While Mao is clearly seeking to improve relations with the	
Indian Government, he remains distrustful of Nehru's attitude towa	
China and the bloc. reported they found be	oth 25X1
Chinese and Soviet leaders united in their suspicions of the Indian	
prime minister.	
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'ياقي	25X1
	20/(1

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Political Maneuvering in Dayos May Lead to Government Crisis

Political maneuvering in Vientiane over how to postpone the national elections scheduled for December is producing friction which could lead to a government crisis. Premier Phoui's conservative Rally of the Lao People (RLP) favors a constitutional amendment extending the incumbent National Assembly's mandate.

The army-backed Committee for the Defense of National Interests (CDNI), which shares power with the RLP, is obstructing moves toward a constitutional amendment, however, and appears to favor permitting the assembly's mandate to expire on schedule in December, at which time the regent, Prince Savang, would set a new date for elections and appoint an interim government. The CDNI probably calculates that the regent, a strong CDNI supporter, would give it a greater share of cabinet portfolios, if not eliminate Phoui and the RLP altogether.

Phoui himself has voiced concern that the CDNI, with army backing, may be considering taking advantage of the present dilemma over the elections to deny the RLP its "rightful share" of authority until new elections are possible. The extraordinary powers granted the Phoui government by the present legislature expire in January, and Phoui hopes to have them renewed after the constitutional amendment. On his current trip to the US, Phoui was careful to include in his entourage Foreign Minister Kamphan Panya, a leading CDNI figure, and Secretary of State for National Defense Col. Phoumi, believed to be a strong advocate of thinly disguised army rule in Laos.)

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African Nationalists Demonstrate in Kenya

Tension continues high in Kenya, where police on 20 October broke up a demonstration by African nationalists for the release of convicted Mau Mau leader Jomo Kenyatta. Earlier, African leader Tom Mboya had been forced to sign bond to keep the peace for 90 days--a move designed to block the demonstration but one which had little effect.

A major source of friction between the government and African nationalists is the government's refusal to legalize Mboya's Kenya Independence Group, on the grounds that it does not meet the requirement that all parties be multiracial. A second major issue is the government's 13 October proposal that the rich White Highlands farm area be opened to all races. The proposal has been attacked by Mboya as well as by rightist settlers; Mboya apparently believes that the government had not gone far enough, and also may fear that the government intends economic concessions to be a substitute for political concessions to Africans.

The demonstration for Kenyatta appears to have been planned in the face of indications that it would lead to Mboya's physical arrest, and was probably directed less toward the release of Kenyatta than toward embarrassing the Kenya Government. Mboya's leadership of the Kenyatta demonstration may enhance his prestige among Africans prior to the constitutional conference scheduled for early 1960 and offset to some degree his involvement in the factionalism which has lately plagued the African members of the Legislative Council?

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III. THE WEST

Bolivian Minister of Government Threatens to Try a Coup

Minister of Government Guevara Arce--who is aligned with the moderate faction in Bolivia's government party, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR)--threatens to try to take over the government if Congress should adjourn without resolving a struggle between President Siles and the country's acting vice president, who is also president of the Senate and a Siles opponent. Guevara's objective is to protect the position of the moderate faction within the MNR and to prevent left-wing domination of the MNR's approaching convention. Since the MNR polled 80 percent of the vote in 1956 and 1958, the candidates nominated by the convention for the presidential and congressional elections to be held in mid-1960 are virtually assured of victory. Guevara has presidential ambitions.

Guevara would be helped in a coup by 800 armed miners now in
La Paz and possibly by the police. Leftist miners and possibly
other armed militia loyal to leftist labor leader Juan Lechin would
oppose Guevara. The Bolivian Army would tend to side with the
moderate faction, while the widely feared rural militia would prob-
ably favor the left wing. A coup attempt by either the moderate or
the leftist faction of the MNR would result in an intense struggle
for power and possibly in civil strife.

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